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“Following the Séléka coup, the disintegration of the state has exacerbated local conflicts and 
banditry giving rise to constant insecurity in Bangui and the provinces. This violence in itself 
perpetuates the crisis as bloodshed feeds mistrust, fear, and the desire for revenge. Given the 
breakdown of law and order, the current crisis is a combination of multiple conflicts with 
national and local dimensions and violent crimes.”1 
 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
 The Central African Republic (CAR) is located in the heart of the African continent. 
Although being extremely rich in natural resources, it has been plagued by decades of instability 
after gaining independence from its former, but still very much present, colonial power, France. 
It has experienced many corrupt leaders and foreign backed coup d’états, that saw an extensive 
power vacuums and failed governments. As one of the world’s poorest countries, the population 
is divided and is still in the midst of a seemingly endless humanitarian and political conflict even 
though there have been significant endeavors to achieve peace.
2
 According to the 2016 United 
Nations’ (UN) Development Report, CAR is ranked in the last position at 188 out of 188 
countries in terms of successful development.
3
   
 The country has been experiencing extensive violence and chaos since the end of 2012. 
In 2014, the conflict was described as the ‘worst crisis you’ve never heard of’ by Samantha 
Powers, former United States Ambassador to the UN.
4
 Being one of the world’s under-reported 
crises, multiple international organizations, including the UN, referred to the conflict as 
neglected.  Half of CAR’s population faces hunger and is in extreme need of aid due to the 
conflict. The donor fatigue and the lack of interest comes from the fact that CAR is not seen as a 
political player and insignificant on the global level. It is a country that is not well-known and is 
not mentioned on the international stage, but CAR has 4 million suffering people. In terms of 
aid, there is money coming into CAR, there is a fairly large peacekeeping mission but the fact is 
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that the conflict is not receiving much attention from donors or from the larger public. The 
appeal for aid in CAR is grossly underfunded. The healthcare standards have decreased, there is 
an emergence of diseases that have been eliminated in other parts of the world now resurfacing. 
Moreover, since the crisis started, the events have been overshadowed by other conflicts in the 
world, specifically the Russian military intervention of Ukraine, Syria’s civil war, and the rise of 
the so-called Islamic State. But there is still an obligation to ensure that the Central Africans can 
create development to the best of their ability.  
 CAR has been suffering the consequences of long-running violence and a history of 
political abuse, leaving the landlocked country in a crisis that has seen, at the time of writing, 
strong efforts to resolve the conflict but simultaneously, a re-emergence of violence. In this 
thesis, I will discuss the historical background of CAR, the conflicts’ origins, ethnic cleansing, 
and the peacebuilding process. The research question for this thesis is what steps have been taken 
to facilitate stability and peacebuilding by both the local and international community during the 
current crisis? What has the peacebuilding process entailed and why has it not been sustainable? 
 
Methodology 
 
 This thesis will be conducted by utilizing peacebuilding literature, from definitions 
created by the UN to critical academic text on the subject. It will also employ reports from 
international and humanitarian organizations and news agencies to collect data from the various 
actors present in CAR in order to provide context. By using an observational and research case 
study, I will apply the peacebuilding literature to the Central African case and include the 
established initiatives to determine why peace has not yet been achieved despite the efforts. This 
research “case study relies on multiple sources of evidence and multiple data collection 
techniques.”5 The main technique that will be employed includes researching prior peace treaties, 
religious actors roles, the UN Mission, amongst others. 
 The theoretical framework that will apply to the Central African case study is 
humanitarianism and it is discussed later in the text. Humanitarianism as a theory is extremely 
applicable to my research and to the subject because of CAR’s colonial history, the presence of 
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humanitarian and international actors, etc. It will also address the nexus between peacebuilding 
and humanitarianism.  
 I will argue that the peacebuilding has failed because most of their initiatives are created 
externally. There is a lack of political participation from CAR citizens in these decisions and 
agreements. Also, the warring armed groups do not have confidence in ceasefires; there is severe 
distrust of the ‘other’ and discourages disarmament. There has not been a sufficient amount of 
effort dedicated to the education aspect of peacebuilding and this is a major concern because it is 
necessary in order to create sustainable stability, particularly amongst the youth.  
 The research design of a case study is a practical choice for this topic because due to 
financial and physical limitations, I am not able to conduct independent research in the country 
nor have I been able to conduct interviews with Central African citizens affected by the conflict 
and contact international actors on the ground. 
 
1.1 Conceptualizing CAR  
 
 CAR gained independence in 1960, alongside most of the other French colonies in 
Africa. The country was not equipped to be a fully-fledged state when granted independence 
because it lacked prominent governing institutions and was led by autocratic leaders. French 
officials remained present in all sectors of government, security agreements and treaties that 
ensured France could continue to promote its interests in CAR politics and economic production. 
Therefore, the local population did not have an overwhelming sense of independence because 
their colonizer was present in the decolonization process.
6
 
 The first Central African president was David Dacko. Dacko created a one-party state 
with Movement for the Social Evolution of Black Africa-MESAN as the only political party in 
1962. As a result, he was re-elected as president because he was the only candidate in the 1964 
elections.
7
  
 The French and their business interests intervened to put their preferred candidate in 
power in 1965. France supported Jean-Bédel Bokassa for CAR leadership and facilitated 
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Dacko’s ousting during the period when the country was facing bankruptcy and on the brink of a 
nationwide strike. Bokassa, an army commander, can be characterized as an archetypal African 
dictator, who modeled himself after Emperor Napoleon Bonaparte. In 1976, Bokassa proclaimed 
himself emperor and officially named the country the “Central African Empire.”8 For the Central 
Africans, he is remembered as a nationalist, an extravagant leader that was the last politician to 
build anything of note. In CAR’s capital city, Bangui, most of the infrastructure and city 
buildings, including the country’s only university, were constructed during Bokassa’s reign. To 
this day, he is considered to be a glorified leader.
9
 
 Dacko, in collaboration with the French, ousted Bokassa after 11 years in power while he 
was on official state business to Libya. French parachutists invaded CAR and occupied all 
strategic posts and Dacko again resumed power in 1979. The motivation for this coup was 
caused by widespread protests due to the detainment and murder of schoolchildren who refused 
to purchase school uniforms from a wife of Bokassa.
10
 
 In the 1970s, economic decline started due to foreign businessmen and their interests 
leaving, the price of global communities dropping, and the country’s money being mismanaged. 
CAR has yet to fully recover from these events. The 1980s and 1990s saw adjustments in 
governmental structures, a reduction of civil services rolls and presidents who ruled with 
clientelism methods, combined with a donor-led push for a multi-party democracy in the early 
1990s, made for an unstable mix. In the mid-1990s, army mutinies occurred followed by several 
coup attempts and a rebellion. There were two coup successful attempts.
11
 
 In March 2003, a former head of the army, François Bozizé, claimed power by seizing 
Bangui and declaring himself president. He then dissolved the parliament and established a 
transitional government. A referendum for the new constitution was approved in December 
2004. In May 2005, Bozizé won presidential elections in a run-off vote.
12
 In March 2013, Bozizé 
himself was overthrown by Michel Djotodia, a former civil servant and his armed militia, the 
Séléka. CAR has been under the guidance and instruction of France, the UN, and numerous 
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regional organizations since the mid-1990s due to political instability and pockets of rebellions 
in the eastern part of the country.
13
 Therefore, CAR’s political and power culture is inherently 
competitive and unstable. This competition and its relationship to the power culture has created 
chronic insecurity which resulted in the ability to utilize violence to takeover governments.  
 CAR has continuously been contingent on aid and concession kickbacks, but the 
deterioration of the marginal private sector that existed until the 1980s has made this reliance 
nearly total. Despite that the concessionary system concluded years ago, concessionary politics 
have increased and spread in practice. Beforehand, concessions were chiefly approved for the 
extraction of natural resources, but now, due to foreign aid, all government privileges have been 
turned into concessions as well, resulting in the across-the-board outsourcing of CAR’s 
sovereignty.
14
 
 This is significant because it contradicts the assumptions that motivate all international 
development aid. Development assistance and funding programs assume that the drive to govern 
is dormant, just not actualized due to non-existent human or material resources. However, that 
assumption is conflicting to the main recurring historical tendencies found in CAR’s system of 
governance.
15
 Due to the mixture of political insecurity and short funding cycles, neither Central 
African officials nor international aid representatives have the capacity to make substantial, 
effective long-term plans. More precisely, while the objectives are always distant and long-term 
for state-building, only short-term work is possible. An improved strategy for accountability 
inadequacies, and frustration for all the actors involved, could not be found.
16
 
 The long-term, sustainable vision of creating a functional state is an ideal that Central 
Africans hold. For CAR citizens, this vision is focused on a provision of entitlements. In 
contrast, the state they do have is focused on extraction from regular people, such as in the form 
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of crippling taxation that goes directly into government employees’ pockets. There is a massive 
lack of faith in the government because the people see the officials as corrupt.
17
 
 While most of the country lacks a structured economy, businesspeople, mainly Muslims, 
from throughout the region have seen CAR as a place where there are opportunities to be 
successful.
18
 For an assortment of reasons, the non-Muslim Central African population is not 
opening businesses. This allows many economic opportunities for Muslims and for foreigners 
that practice Islam. Almost all of the profitable market shops are owned and operated by 
Muslims.
19
 Thus, CAR has seen high numbers of Muslim migration from neighboring states, 
such as Cameroon, Chad, and Nigeria. Non-Muslim Central Africans have been inviting these 
foreigners in, but remain apprehensive about losing their country’s natural resources to them.20 
 Concerned with the material dispossession by foreigners, Central Africans have used this 
concern as the key factor in mobilizing nationalism. Central African identity is determined by 
speaking the regional language of Sango. As a result of the French colonization, Sango spread as 
way to communicate without interference. Sango is considered to be a symbol of Central African 
nationalism, and if one cannot speak it, then you will not be thought of as a true Central 
African.
21
  
 Religion is also an indicator of national identity. Due to colonial history, everything 
related to the state is related to Christianity and Bangui traditions, whereas Muslim symbols are 
considered “foreign and dangerous.”22 This leaves Muslim Central Africans disconnected to the 
country’s sense of unity and cannot claim their nationality. Although they are not officially 
stateless, in effective terms they are often deprived of citizenship and/or otherwise characterized 
as suspicious. 
 However, there is a difference between Muslims with ties to West Africa and Muslims 
with familial connections to Chad and Sudan. Non-Muslim Central Africans determine those 
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connected to Chad and Sudan as particularly dangerous, for both long-term and short-term 
historical reasons. When Bozizé claimed the presidency in March 2003, a majority of his armed 
followers were Chadian or Darfur Muslims. These groups were voracious in achieving their goal 
and rewarding themselves for their work through violence, looting, etc. Furthermore, regional 
leaders and their governments both enthusiastically and inertly supported the forceful changes of 
authority in 2003 and 2013. This augmented Central Africans’ sense of powerlessness and 
anxiety over the attrition of their sovereignty.
23
  
 
1.2 Conflict Overview 
 In 1993, CAR held its first free elections. President Ange Felix Patasse won re-election in 
1999. Being the country’s first freely elected president, this gave Patasse a sense of political 
legitimacy and support from citizens. However, in 2003, Bozizé organized a coup with Libyan 
help and declared himself president. As a result, numerous rebellions arose in rural areas because 
of the undemocratic transition of power. These rebellions were contained and did not reach the 
capital. After some time, the network of privileged elites that were profiting from Bozize’s 
government became narrower and centered on family members and the Evangelical Church.
24
 
 “Throughout the decade of la Bozizie, as Bozizé clientelistic mode of operating became 
known, CAR went through intentionally-led peacebuilding and state-building initiatives meant to 
address the ongoing rural rebellions by fostering inclusiveness.”25 This inclusiveness was present 
in name only because local and international actors realized they had little resources and means 
of addressing the rebellions. 
 The CAR citizens, international agents, diplomats, and other political and military actors 
became progressively frustrated with Bozizé regime. In March 2012, a few of these ostracized 
political elites and ‘military entrepreneurs’ organized a meeting in Niamey, Niger, and planned 
an overthrow. By December 2012, they formed an assorted rebel coalition composed of Chadian, 
Sudanese, and Central Africans, and a few other nationalities called the Séléka, or alliance in 
Sango. The Séléka consisted of mostly Muslims. Following this, the rebels took over Ndele, a 
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northeastern town and then marched to Bangui. Regional governments and their leaders 
determined Séléka’s motivation to take Bangui not to be a serious threat.26 
 Idriss Déby Itno, the president of Chad, sent extra soldiers to the Mission for the 
Consolidation of Peace in Central African People (MICOPAX), which was operating as the sub-
regional peacekeeping mission in the country. These soldiers were successful in preventing the 
Séléka from reaching the Damar line, which is 70 kilometers from Bangui. In early January 
2013, Bozizé, leaders of the Séléka, and also select representatives from the civil society, met in 
Libreville, Gabon, for negotiations. These negotiations mostly consisted of peace talks. The 
regional leaders present previously determined both the agenda and the favored solutions before 
the negotiations took place. The solution proposed was quick and easy; it was not sustainable.
27
 
 In March 2013, the Séléka initiated a new advance toward Bangui. This time, the Chadian 
army did not intervene because of Séléka’s military sophistication. CAR’s army was rendered 
ineffective and subsequently, it dissolved. Séléka leader, Michel Djotodia, claimed that the 
capital was under their control. International organizations and governmental actors from the 
region and global community condemned the violent change of power, but no actor voiced 
enough concern to resolve the situation. Séléka’s Djotodia cannot be considered a legitimate 
leader because he claimed power forcefully and in an undemocratic manner.
28
 
 Consequently,  insecurity grew. Since the early days of the Séléka in late 2012, they had 
been controlling rural villages as fiefdoms. Extreme violence occurred on a massive scale 
including killings, dispossessions, etc. With the absence of Bozizé, Séléka rebels advanced 
towards the western and northern regions of the country. As their presence and territory 
expanded, there was little unity among the various armed groups that labeled themselves Séléka. 
Without an unified leadership, ad hoc violence and pillaging were their primary methods of 
obtaining control.
29
 
 Due to the security vacuum, embassies, humanitarian organizations, and the UN 
Integrated Peacebuilding support Office in CAR (BINUCA) withdrew their foreign staff from in 
late 2012 to early 2013. A select number of remaining diplomats and state politicians argued that 
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a well-armed and geographically dispersed peacekeeping presence would be needed to restore 
even the rather dire status quo, but the international and regional response was overall inert. 
Diplomats and donors expressed dismay from afar but were reluctant to resolve the problems in 
what they had come to a consider a repeatedly miserable mess. 
 Djotodia officially disbanded the Séléka in September 2013 because he lost control of the 
group. At the same time, Christian Central Africans began to militarize and mobilize against the 
Séléka. These militarized mobilizations were consistent with a tradition of self-defense groups 
throughout most of CAR.
30
  
 The group that mobilized as a response to the Séléka and their violent abuses was the 
anti-Balaka. The name derives from two common sources: the first is a reference to its initiation 
ceremonies, which members believed to make them impermeable to the Russian Kalashnikov 
bullets (balles-AK, or balaka). Secondly, balaka means machete in the regional language, Gbaya. 
This language is spoken in the area around Bozizé’s home region of Bossangoa, and hence the 
anti-Balaka are those who counter the use of violence (machetes, etc.) against them and their 
kin.
31
  
 In September 2013, the anti-Balaka introduced a sectarian component to the upheaval. 
This dimension saw bilateral and international diplomatic agents begin to mobilize and advocate 
for a response, in the form of peacekeepers and humanitarian aid. The ‘genocide card’ was 
played by these actors when describing the violence that the anti-Balaka was committing against 
the Muslim population as revenge.
32
 By playing the genocide card, it garnered the attention of 
the international community. It is the key foundation of influence when trying to mobilize 
interventions.
33
  
 In December 2013, this mobilization subsequently saw France deploy peacekeepers. The 
French mission, Sangaris, targeted the Séléka for disarmament, which caused these fighters to 
flee. Civilian Muslims that were protected by the Séléka were now vulnerable to anti-Balaka 
assaults. In January 2014, the African Union (AU) deployed their mission, the International 
                                                 
30
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Support Mission to CAR (MISCA). These deployments of armed peacekeepers occurred during 
an intense violent period against Muslims. For example, on December 5, 2013, there was an 
extremely violent rampage in a Muslim neighborhood that resulted in looting, destroyed houses, 
and killings. In the west and center of CAR, there were thousands killed at this time. In 2014, 
when the highest levels of violence were seen, more than one million people, or 25 percent of the 
population, became displaced. These displaced populations either moved to other areas within 
CAR or fled to the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Chad, and Cameroon.
34
  
 The presence of peacekeepers did not deter the widespread violence. President Déby 
intervened by calling the transitional government of CAR to Ndjamena in early January. The 
president persuaded Djotodia to resign from power. He introduced a process whereby the 
transitional government chose Catherine Samba-Panza as the new transitional president. Samba-
Panza was an experienced lawyer, businesswoman, and a previous mayor of Bangui.
35
  
 In Bangui, the local population was frustrated with the peacekeeping operations, which 
they determined to be only concerned with protecting the government rather than protecting and 
preventing further violence against civilians in various neighborhoods.
36
 The AU and French 
presence were visible in Bangui but their positioning was limited to main streets, even though 
most of the violence occurred near the residences and side streets.  
 An important factor that caused a negative perception of the AU intervention was the fact 
that a high percentage of their peacekeepers were from Cameroon, Chad, and the two Congos. 
Their countries were the first to be on the ground for the mission. The troops were stationed 
along their state’s borders, which was a sensible approach operationally, but their proximity to 
their own countries saw their focus on their own countries and provided them with more 
commerce opportunities and other border trade activities. This supplemented the local 
population’s suspicions that these soldiers were only in CAR for personal gain.37 
 In the early 2014, violence remained intense. On 29 March, an infamous incident 
occurred that saw the peacekeepers commit bloodshed. Although there is dispute over the exact 
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events, a preliminary investigation by the UN Human Rights Office found Chadian soldiers to be 
guilty of killing thirty civilians and severely wounding approximately 300 when they fired upon 
a crowded market in Bangui. According to the report, the soldiers fired ‘without any 
provocation.’38 Interim President Samba-Panza criticized the violence and sought to reprimand 
those peacekeepers, whom she determined to be accountable. Consequently, President Déby 
instantly withdrew the Chadian peacekeepers.
39
 Chadian troops should have exited CAR far 
earlier because of a great conflict of interest. A substantial number of the Séléka were former 
members of the Chadian military. Therefore, they were considered to be partial and accomplices 
for initiating the conflict.  
 At this time, France and other members of the international diplomatic elite sought 
support for a UN mission that would replace MISCA. There were many motivations for this 
advocacy. First, Central African representatives preferred the UN to the AU because of the 
mistrust and wariness of the African troops. Second, France believed a UN operation would 
allow them to slowly exit the conflict, diminishing their involvement. Their Sangaris operation 
was not supposed to last as long as it did and it was expensive, the daily expense being 800,000 
Euros.
40
   
 On April 10, 2014, the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the 
Central African Republic (MINUSCA) was authorized under resolution 2149 due to “concerns 
with the security, humanitarian, human rights and political crisis in the Central African Republic 
and its regional implications.”41 The transition to MINUSCA lasted many months and officials 
arrived in CAR for the operation. Initially, these officials wanted to solve CAR’s crisis with an 
innovative solution instead of following decisions made by prior peacebuilders. But, their 
proposals produced with the assistance from the interim government were extremely similar to 
previous ones. The literature of the proposals included topics such as "political dialogue; 
disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration; and free democratic elections."
42
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 After the UN authorized their mission, the number of humanitarian organizations 
increased. Before the Séléka emerged, there were approximately 25 international non-
governmental organizations (INGOs). Their number grew to over a hundred by March 2016.
43
 
MINUSCA’s mandate expanded to include humanitarian/civilian and military dimensions. 
Nonetheless, the violence continued despite the peacekeeper’s presence and the troops had 
difficulty responding effectively.  
 The current authorization numbers provided by MINUSCA’s website has 12,870 
uniformed personnel. The breakdown of this number is 10,750 military personnel, including 489 
Military Observers and Military Staff Officers and 2,080 police personnel. The police personnel 
includes 400 Individual Police Officers and 108 corrections officers. The site states ‘an 
appropriate significant civilian component.’44 
 In late October 2016, France officially ended its Sangaris military operation. According 
to the French Defense Minister Jean Yves Le Drian, the Sangaris mission was successful in 
protecting civilian populations and preventing fighting.
45
 However, not many of the French 
achievements were sustainable and they were accused of protecting the anti-Balaka. Also, there 
have been allegations of sexual abuses and rape by French soldiers, which will be mentioned in 
the justice section of the thesis.  
 
1.3 Religious or Political Conflict?  
 Christian elites have exploited the idea that the Christian majority is superior to the 
Muslim minority and that narrative has fueled the constant discrimination of Muslims. The 
leaders of the Christian and Muslim communities have characterized post-independent CAR to 
be a period of harmony between the religions. However, multiple documentaries that have 
interviewed those Muslims fleeing from the anti-Balaka have described their relationship with 
the Christian majority as full of discrimination and it has been that way for decades. The 
Christians have questioned the authenticity of the Muslim’s Central African identity. In the early 
1980s, Muslims faced difficulty when attempting to obtain state recognition for their 
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organizations. In the 1990s, a modus vivendi was agreed upon by the communities.
46
 The historic 
image of CAR as a nation on the frontline of a Christian sub-Saharan Africa facing the Muslim 
North provided the government’s unwillingness to recognize Muslim organizations. Christians 
still refer to the pre-colonial period that saw their religion threatened by ruling sultans. Some 
Christians believe that CAR is the target of an ‘Islamization plan’ that has been supported by 
their Muslim neighbors, Sudan, Chad, and Libya. This conspiracy nourished this feature of 
CAR’s political climate.47 
 Bozizé and his followers revitalized this underlying fear of Islamization when the Séléka 
was advancing towards Bangui in December 2012. They spurred counter action by calling the 
Séléka “Muslim invaders.”48 This anti-Islam rhetoric was widely accepted and spread throughout 
the western provinces. These provinces were the location where the Séléka committed many 
mass atrocities in 2013 and this created the conditions that inspired deadly religious prejudice 
and incited the establishment of the anti-Balaka.
49
  
 By early 2014, this discourse took hold and the conflict came to the point of including not 
only the armed groups but also civilians. A popular movement rejecting the Séléka emerged in 
northwestern Ouham and Ouham-Pende prefectures. It took up arms with support from former 
members of the army and decided to retake Bangui. In early 2014, Bangui residents and the west 
considered this ethnic-regional movement to be patriotic and framed their goals in ruthless 
pseudo-religious and nationalist terms: “hunt down Séléka and their Muslim supporters, who are 
not Central African and who are trying to forcibly Islamize the country.”50 
 After the Djotodia’s fall, the non-Muslim majority held all Muslims responsible for the 
violence committed under its rule by association. The perception of the Muslim community’s 
complicity with the Séléka was so widespread that in early 2014, there was a wave of anti-
Muslim violence that caused significant population displacement and created Muslim enclaves in 
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western cities. In December, the UN estimated the number of refugees at 452,000 and the 
number of internally displaced persons (IDP’s) at 447,000.51 
 In 2014, the Séléka leadership claimed their group was needed to defend and protect 
Muslims and created a solution to divide the country. In July 2014, the partitioning idea was 
presented by Séléka’s representatives at the Brazzaville negotiations; this will be discussed later. 
Séléka leaders persisted with their cause of defending Muslims as a way to mobilize support and 
strengthen their publicity efforts.
52
 
 Both external actors and local Central Africans have seen and depicted the crisis through 
a religious lens. The international media and news agencies have reported the conflict as a 
religious war. At the Bangui Form, which is discussed later, the participants described the crisis 
as a “political conflict with a religious dimension.”53 But this is not universally accepted because 
a significant percentage of the civilians consider it to be solely a religious conflict. The term 
community is used to describe religious communities. Due to the research, I have come to the 
conclusion that the conflict started as a political crisis that turned more violent as the religious 
element spread. 
 
1.4 ‘Ethnic Cleansing’  
 
The development of the term ‘ethnic cleansing’ emerged in the context of the 
Yugoslavian conflict in the 1990s and has thought to be a translation from a Serbian and 
Croatian expression. Because ethnic cleansing is independent of genocide in international law, 
there is no exact definition or criteria. A UN Commission of Experts mandated to investigate 
international humanitarian law violations committed in Yugoslavia provided a definition of 
ethnic cleansing in their final report, “a purposeful policy designed by one ethnic or religious 
group to remove by violent and terror-inspiring means the civilian population of another ethnic 
or religious group from certain geographic areas.”54 The Commission of Experts also detailed 
that the forcible methods used to remove civilian populations can include “murder, torture, 
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arbitrary arrest and detention, extrajudicial executions, rape and sexual assaults, severe physical 
injury to civilians, confinement of civilian population in ghetto areas.”55  
 After the Séléka overthrew Bozizé, Djotodia suspended the constitution and dissolved 
parliament in March 2013 and assumed the presidency in August 2013. During this period, the 
Séléka was violently attacking Christians. As a response, the anti-Balaka militia harshly 
retaliated by brutally killing thousands of Muslims and forced thousands from their homes. The 
fighting began in September 2013 and escalated when the anti-Balaka forces attacked Bangui’s 
Muslim neighborhoods on December 5, 2013. This ignited fighting on a broader scale. After a 
backlash from the international community due to his forced path to power and his inability to 
stop the fighting after he dissolved the Séléka coalition, Djotodia resigned in January 2014. The 
Séléka continued fighting which resulted in the members of the coalition forming armed political 
parties.
56
 
 In December 2014, the United Nations Commission of Inquiry on the Central African 
Republic (COI) issued a report finding a “pattern of ethnic cleansing committed by anti-Balaka 
in the areas in which Muslims had been living.”57 In early January 2014, the anti-Balaka emptied 
CAR’s western and northwestern villages of Muslims. The anti-Balaka was reported to even kill 
fleeing Muslims, including those in humanitarian-assisted evacuation convoys. The UN reported 
that in 2014, 99 percent of Muslim residents in Bangui fled, 80 percent of CAR’s Muslim 
population fled to Cameroon or Chad (which was estimated to be around 15 percent of the 
population at the beginning of the conflict), and 417 out of 436 mosques were destroyed.
58
 
Amnesty International has described this assault as a “Muslim exodus of historic proportions.”59 
 
Chapter 2: Peacebuilding Initiatives  
 
2.1 Definitions and Literature Review  
                                                 
55
 Shraga, Daphna, and Ralph Zacklin. "The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia." European 
Journal of International Law 5, no. 1: 366. 
56
“Central African Republic: Erased Identity: Muslims in Ethnically Cleansed Areas of the Central African 
Republic.” Amnesty International, July 31, 2015. 
57
 Laduba, Patryk. “What Lies Beneath the ‘G’ Word? Genocide-Labelling and Fact-Finding at UN.” Blog of the 
European Journal of International Law, May 28, 2015.  
58
 Annual Report, 2017. U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom, found at 
http://www.uscirf.gov/sites/default/files/CentralAfricanRepublic.2017.pdf  
59
 Jones, Sam. “UN finds ‘ample evidence’ of war crimes committed in Central African Republic.” The Guardian, 
June 6 2014.  
s1893874 
18 
 
 The most recent definition provided by the UN was in 2007 as delivered by the Secretary-
General’s Policy Committee: “a range of measures targeted to reduce the risk of lapsing or 
relapsing into conflict by strengthening national capacities at all levels for conflict management, 
and to lay the foundation for sustainable peace and development. Peacebuilding strategies must 
be coherent and tailored to the specific needs of the country concerned, based on national 
ownership, and should comprise a carefully prioritized, sequenced, and relatively narrow set of 
activities aimed at achieving the above objectives.”60 
 According to the UN Peacebuilding Fund website, the Secretary-General organized his 
peacebuilding strategy in three official 2009 reports, which listed five recurrent priority areas for 
international assistance: 1. Support to basic safety and security; 2. Political processes; 3. 
Provision for basic services; 4. Restoration of core government functions; 5. Economic 
revitalization.
61
 The Secretary-General Panel Committee’s 2012 report suggested that the UN 
and other international partners have to take on more action in order to ensure that states 
emerging from violence have their own capacity to contain and respond to their conflict and 
encourage sustainable peace. The report identified “inclusivity, institution building and sustained 
international support, as critical actions in preventing relapse into violence and producing more 
resilient societies. Successful peacebuilding processes must be transformative, creating space for 
a wider set of actors including women, youth, marginalized groups, civil society, and the private 
sector-to participate in national post-conflict decision-making.”62  
When considering the concept of building state institutions, the report states that the 
public sector and social services must deliver justifiable and responsible reactions when 
responding to the grievances of a population in order to rebuild the country’s legitimacy. The 
2012 report focuses on the UN’s experiences and lessons learnt from peacebuilding operations. It 
also reflects on discussions regarding expanding policy to include all the actors and stakeholders 
involved in peacebuilding.
63
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 The UN has provided an overall general framework for its peacebuilding objectives and 
activities. The peacebuilding programs are “strategic, prioritized interventions driven by the 
analysis of peace and conflict that address underlying causes or drivers and consequences of 
conflict.”64 According to the UN, their programs create strong peace agreements and build 
confidence in the transition period by contributing to the restoration of social services and 
encouraging societal unity. This could include facilitation of activities that promote participation 
and inclusivity in politics, creating a dialogue and reconciliation efforts, or enhance accessibility 
to human security and justice.  
‘Peace dividends’ could be included in peacebuilding programs. ‘Peace dividends’ means 
having concrete results of the peacebuilding operations that are preferably conducted by the state 
and they can be accessible to their citizens. Another method is the creation of incentives to 
promote non-violent behavior. This will decrease fear and anxiety amongst the communities and 
initiate a process of installing trust in the state institutions and the wider process of establishing 
peace. The government, public, and social services can address the underlying tensions and 
grievances of the people, which has the possibility to resurface and spur more violence. When 
the public administration conducts itself in this frame, it provides a platform to strengthen its 
legitimacy and accountability systems.
65
   
 The UN definitions usually refer to peacebuilding in post-conflict situations. CAR’s 
conflict is still ongoing but has made strides for peace. There are a number of peacebuilding 
operations being conducted by state and non-state actors. The 2015 and 2016 general elections 
were relatively peaceful and that demonstrated that there has been glimmers of stability and 
peace but simultaneously there are pockets of violence in certain regions in the country. 
Therefore, UN definitions of peacebuilding limits CAR’s context. 
 It is difficult to measure when a conflict can transition to the post stage. Peace as defined 
by Patricia Daley is a “process as opposed to just an abrupt end to conflict.”66 Consequently, 
Daley’s definition logically applies to CAR’s conflict. “It is common knowledge that for a peace 
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process to end war, it should be founded upon certain principles such as broad-based transitional 
government, demobilization, and reform of the national security apparatus.”67 
 This section reviews the academic literature on the conduct and concept of 
internationally-led peacebuilding. The notion of peacebuilding has gained attention and 
prevalence due to its rise in the 1990s and 2000s. This increased trend can be demonstrated by 
the high numbers of operations conducted by UN or regional organizations. There has been a 
growth in external and foreign actors present in conflict areas, frequently located in Africa. 
These actors operate “to support, to implement, to aid and assist, to monitor, or to enforce 
peace.”68 Although, main components of peacebuilding have “become standardized, “tool 
boxed,” mainstreamed and institutionalized, mainly at the level of international organizations 
and major donors who became the central nodes of what has been the international peacebuilding 
regime.”69 
 The growth and expansion of international peacebuilding have created critiques in the 
academic world due to the concept’s ethical foundations, debating the underlying premises and 
sociopolitical practices of peacebuilding. Peacebuilding became a standard operational process 
and created a structuralized international engagement field. This is contested  because 
“peacebuilding is understood as a set of controversial universalized norms which is related to 
other contested norms of international politics, (e.g. “responsibility to protect) and is embedded 
in concepts of a Western-dominated international order.”70 
 The key argument is that the standardized global peacebuilding concept is unavoidably 
paternalistic because it is most likely facilitated by agents who claim that they know what is best 
for war-torn populations. External actors have to adhere to their ‘superior’ preconceived recipes 
for creating stability and peace. This method of ‘care and control’ seems to be a major 
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characterization and inevitable feature of peacebuilding.
71
 Critics have described international 
peacebuilding projects as “neo-colonial, Eurocentric, securitized or paternalistic.”72 
 According to Paffenholz, peace relies on a civil society that is fortified and vibrant; 
peacebuilding requires mobilization and empowerment of the civil society and motivate political 
participation of the broader society.
73
 Peacebuilding must include state and institution building 
because without these administrative structures, the process will fail. The process requires a 
peaceful and civil society where public order and stability can be seen.
74
 
 Various studies indicate that internationally-led peacebuilding operations, most notably 
those that have a peacekeeping presence, have the capacity to reduce violence and facilitate 
negotiations between the conflicting parties. There is a popular belief that assistance from the 
international community makes a significant difference. According to Doyle and Sambanis, the 
likelihood of success is dependent on the interplay of three main conditions which incorporate a 
“peacebuilding triangle”: the degree of aggression of the parties, the extent of local actor’s 
capacities after the conflict, and the magnitude of international assistance. Their main argument 
is “the deeper the hostility, the more the destruction of local capacities, the more one needs 
international assistance to succeed in establishing a stable peace.”75  
 Therefore, Doyle and Sambanis suggest that the more violent a conflict is, the more 
international initiatives are needed to facilitate sustainable peacebuilding. However, there are 
limitations to this formula. The design underestimates the magnitude of peacebuilding operations 
and the fact that more complex tasks and activities are required. More outside actors have to be 
involved. “Inevitably, the result is an increasing number of context-related or actor-related 
factors which makes it extremely difficult to identify those explaining variables and casual links 
responsible for success or failure of peacebuilding.”76 
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 The academic literature on peacebuilding practices lacks universality because it is written 
from the perspective of external actors. Reflecting on it, the content is largely focused on success 
and failure, operations, and problems. The local actors’ role is touched upon but it is merely 
discussed as an intervening or contextual variable in which to demonstrate and explain the results 
of peacebuilding practices. Most research and studies are one dimensional because they discuss 
peacebuilding as a transfer of skills and resources from external actors to locals and ultimately 
ask how this transformation can be improved to ensure success.  
 From this viewpoint, the concept of local ownership, a notion created by donors, can be 
seen as an “enabling factor to make the medicine go down.”77 Oddly, local ownership is an 
element in peacebuilding practices, which implies that ownership does not necessarily exist but 
requires approval, justification, and support by outside actors.    
 
2.2 Prior Peace Treaties  
 Before the ousting of President Bozizé, a peace deal was signed between him and the 
Séléka alliance during negotiations with the parties representing the government and the 
rebellion. Briefly mentioned earlier in the text, these peace talks were held in Libreville and a 
ceasefire treaty was signed on January 11, 2013. CAR’s neighbors mediated the talks and 
attempted to prevent stability threats and Bozizé’s government. Séléka's delegation required a list 
of demands that were included in the treaty: the release of political prisoners that opposed the 
government and the withdrawal of the majority of foreign troops deployed in CAR to strengthen 
and support the domestic military.   
 The deal called for a transitional government and a parliamentary election to be 
scheduled within a year in order to form a new national assembly. A significant component was 
that the transitional government was to be selected from the opposition. However, the parties 
present at the meeting agreed that Bozizé would stay in power and the opposition would be in the 
position of Prime Minister and have full executive power.  
 The head of the UN Integration Peacebuilding Office in the Central African Republic 
(BINUCA), Margaret Vogt, reported that a “government of national unity would be established” 
as a result of the peace treaty and it was a great precedent “to prevent (CAR) from falling down a 
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slippery slope.”78 Vogt praised her diplomatic efforts that resulted in a peace talk that included 
all parties involved, even though there were high levels of skepticism and criticism that the talks 
lacked legitimacy. Vogt updated the UN Security Council on the peace treaty and the 
international community must be more forcefully involved by means of diplomacy and funds in 
order to save CAR. The then UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon had designated the conflict to 
be on the same level of Mali, Somalia, and Syria.
79
 This Libreville peace treaty failed. After its 
signing, more violence broke out and the Séléka rebel coalition overthrew Bozizé. 
 The next ceasefire agreement signed between the armed groups occurred on July 23, 
2014. Interim President Catherine Samba-Panza, alongside other regional leaders, Congolese 
President Denis Sassou Nguesso and Chandian Prime Minister Kalzeubt Pahimi Deubt delegated 
a ceasefire agreement that had the key representatives from all parties present at a conference 
hosted in the Republic of the Congo’s capital Brazzaville. The delegation resulted in an agreed 
‘tentative ceasefire.’ The agreement was signed by both representatives of the anti-Balaka and 
Séléka forces. The agreement declared that a termination of violence would “take effect in the 
entire territory of CAR.”80 The peace talks were aimed at achieving an agreement that disarmed 
the groups and demobilized the militia forces.  
 At this point, thousands of civilians were killed in the conflict and around 25 percent of 
the country’s population was displaced.81 Following this conference, Mahamat Kamoun was 
selected to be the first Muslim leader to guide the transitional government in August 2014 but 
this was rejected by Séléka rebels. They did not approve because Kamoun was not a member of 
Séléka's rebellion, even though he was the head of the tax agency during Djotodia’s time in 
power. Captain Ibrahim Nedjad, a Séléka spokesman, declared that the Séléka leadership 
nevertheless supported and were committed to the peace accord.
82
  
 Another peace agreement was made between former leaders in April 2015. Djotodia and 
Bozizé conducted peace agreement talks in Nairobi, Kenya, without the presence or 
representation of the interim government. Therefore, the deal was surrounded by illegitimate 
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peace treaty claims. The goal of the agreement was to reaffirm the 2014 treaty. The agreement 
was signed after months of discussions according to Kenya’s president Uhuru Kenyatta. Media 
and new agencies described the deal as meaningless and the specifics of the negotiations were 
not publicly released. However, Bozizé’s speech commenting on the talks expressed his 
commitment to “real peace through reconciliation.”83 
 The Bangui National Forum was a six day national conference held in early May 2015 
presided by Professor Abdoulaye Bathily, the then Special Representative of the United Nations 
Secretary-General for CAR. Religious-based organizations, government representatives, 
civilians, political parties, and members of the media were present for the conference. With this 
representation, which was numbered around 600 people, resulted in the communities having their 
priorities voiced in the peacebuilding process.
84
 The Forum had a sense of legitimacy because it 
was composed of various parties.  
 The conference ended with the then transitional government signing an agreement with 
ten different armed groups. This May 10 agreement included disarmament, demobilization, and 
reintegration (DDR). It detailed the adoption of an agreement on peace, reconstruction, and 
reconciliation.
85
 This declaration of principles, known as the Republican Pact, was approved by 
the majority of the participants on a wide range of issues. The principals were composed of an 
electoral process, principles for the new constitution, redeployment of civil servants, restoration 
of basic services, the immediate implementation of DDR, the creation of a mixed tribunal and a 
truth and reconciliation commission, the need for transitional justice and an integrated national 
development strategy.
86
 It also recommended that Muslim holidays be given official status, a 
longstanding demand of the Muslim community.
87
  
 However, the Forum did not have a concrete and clear implementation procedure. 
Another issue was the lack of financial support to make these resolutions a reality. Therefore, 
although it was a significant endeavor to include various representatives of the population 
affected by the conflict, the results have not had a substantial impact on developing security or 
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progress in CAR’s institutions. The parties that settled on the agreement did not follow through 
with their resolutions; fighting continued and the transitional government was not able to 
consolidate support.
88
 
In 2015, Samba-Panza’s government attempted to reestablish state authority and 
legitimacy across CAR’s territory as a part of the peacebuilding efforts by deploying civil 
servants to the provinces in order to restore state visibility in rural areas. This process was 
organized by the office of the Prime Minister and local administration departments. Although the 
government, civil society members, and international partners agree that local authorities have to 
play an important role in promoting harmony and easing tensions, there is little clarity as to what 
they can contribute and their capacity is unclear. The newly appointed local civil administrators 
are establishing themselves in their new positions and are currently in a dangerous situation, 
particularly when considering the political insecurity. Questions and doubts concerning these 
actors’ impartiality were raised when considering their peacebuilding roles. Trainings conducted 
by local and international experts and resources would be obligatory in order to turn the civil 
administrators into operational peacebuilders.
89
  
 
2.3 2015-2016 General Elections  
 
 One important impact of the Forum was the call for a referendum on a new constitution 
and general elections. On December 13, 2015, CAR held a constitutional referendum in order to 
stabilize the country. Despite the sound of gunfire in the morning in some Bangui 
neighborhoods, polling stations opened and Central African citizens were able to do their civic 
responsibility. Marie-Madeleine N’kouet Hoornaert, president of CAR’s National Authority for 
Elections (ANE) stated: “the people of CAR have realized that the political process should be 
forged through the ballot box and the democracy is the only laudable and honorable path for 
emerging from the crisis.”90 The citizens who commented on the referendum saw it as a glimmer 
of hope and an opportunity to achieve peace and order by establishing a new constitution.  
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  The success of organizing and holding a constitutional referendum in CAR is an 
incredible achievement due to the fighting and insecurity. The crisis weakened and challenged 
any sustainable developmental efforts. To assist with the facilitation and financing of elections, 
multiple partners made donations to the “common basket of funds” to support the election 
process. An integrated collaboration composed of the United Nations Development Program 
(UNDP), MINUSCA, UN WOMEN, the Republic of Congo, Luxembourg, Morocco, Japan, 
Italy, France, United States, the AU, and the European Union (EU), contributed technical and 
financial advice and support to CAR’s ANE. 
 The UNDP provided the ANE with trainings and management for the staff of polling 
stations, and also procured and transported election equipment. Aurélien Agbénonci, the 
representative resident of the UNDP described the challenge of holding an election at a sensitive 
time but the signing of the candidates and political parties’ Code of Conduct by the entire 
political class demonstrated the electoral process’ success.91 
 With the approval of the referendum, CAR proceeded to hold presidential and legislative 
elections on December 30, 2015, in order to encourage further peace efforts. Because no 
presidential candidate obtained the required 50 percent of the majority vote and the Transitional 
Constitutional Court voided the National Assembly election results due to irregularities, a 
secondary round of presidential elections and a new parliamentary vote occurred on February 14, 
2016, with run-offs held on March 31, 2016.
92
,
93
 
 A noteworthy achievement during these elections was that thousands of refugees were 
able to vote in the elections. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) 
reported that its staff facilitated the election process outside of CAR. They stated that their role 
in the election was purely humanitarian, there were no political agendas involved. Refugees that 
were eligible to vote in the Republic of Congo, Chad, and Cameroon were able to participate. 
The refugees hoped that with this election, they could return back to a peaceful CAR. UNHCR 
Africa Director Valentin Tapsoba stated that “this election, including the participation of 
refugees, is a pivotal event in the tragic recent history of the Central African Republic, reflecting 
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a collective will to move on and rebuild a country with strong government, security, rule of law, 
inter-communal harmony and economic growth.”94  The fact that CAR refugees living outside of 
the country were able to participate in this momentous event was significant because it provided 
a sense of inclusion and patriotism, to be able to vote would possibly end the reason they had to 
leave their homes in the first place.  
 Faustin-Archange Touadéra, a former Prime Minister under Bozizé, was elected as 
president in the run-offs by receiving 63 percent of the votes. The voter turnout for the legislative 
and presidential elections was estimated at around 61 percent according to electoral officials. 
Touadéra was the candidate focused on security and completely ending the violent fighting. The 
people viewed him as the leader who can bring peace and help heal the divide between the 
rivaling communities because he is not connected to either of the warring groups. He also 
campaigned on expanding and increasing economic activity.
95
 
 When Touadéra was sworn into office, he promised to deliver disarmament and “make 
CAR a united country, a country of peace, a country facing development.”96 Touadér’s new 
government included three presidential candidates that ran in the first round of the elections. 
Several ministers that had served in Bozizé’s government joined. It can be argued that these 
ministers were selected because of their previous experience with the new President and not due 
to their professional relationships to Bozizé. It is important to note that the new government does 
not to have any Séléka nor anti-Balaka representatives.
97
 
 
2.4 International Organizations’ Roles  
 
MINUSCA’s Civil Affairs Unit  
 
According to MINUSCA’s official website, “the civil affairs team within MINUSCA 
focuses on providing support to local-level efforts and bottom-up approaches to protection, 
political dialogue and the promotion of social cohesion, as well as the extension of state authority 
throughout the Central African Republic, in support to the national and local authorities and in 
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conjunction with the United Nations Country Team.”98 The Civil Affairs element arranges local 
level engagement to develop networks to ensure that the mission is accessible. The unit plays a 
role in supporting cohesion among the components of the mission and external actors. They act 
as a connection between emergency relief and processes of stabilization. There are three primary 
work areas. First, ‘protection and community liaison: liaison with authorities and communities 
on their protection needs, to include the establishment of alert networks and protection plans.’ 
Second, ‘community dialogue and social cohesion: social cohesion, conflict resolution, support 
to civil society organizations and confidence building, including outreach activities. Thirdly, 
‘restoration of state authority: support to the deployment of territorial administration and 
restoration of state authority, preservation of territorial integrity, and strengthening of 
administrative and social services delivery at the local level.’99     
 
International Non-Governmental Organizations  
INGOs responded quickly in order to support, supplement and widen various 
peacebuilding initiatives. Some INGOs that are currently operating in CAR include the Danish 
Refugee Council, Merc Corps, Catholic Relief Services, Fin Church Aid, Cordaid, Center for 
Humanitarian Dialogue, and Search for Common Ground. Their initiatives are supporting and 
training local peace committees, media support, peacebuilding modules education, medical care, 
reviving the local economy, reconciliation sports, and arts. Multiple peacebuilding organizations 
and the humanitarian aid agencies have created programs aimed at social cohesion in order to 
build trust between the communities. This is done by joint activities, particularly community 
development projects, labor-intensive construction projects and sporting and musical events.  
 However, these initiatives lack complementary conflict transformation exercises, where 
divided communities could examine the causes and sources of the conflict and violence and 
commit to non-violent dispute resolution.  
 Several NGOs have focused on the importance of developing youth programs. Because 
the youth has been considered to be the main aggressor due to armed group participation, 
training programs can help stabilize and prevent crime. The Danish Refugee Council and 
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Norwegian Refugee Council have aimed to teach basic skills so that young people can start their 
own businesses as a skilled workers. This incentivizes the youth to continue with employment 
rather than join an armed group. These programs have been popular because they help those 
individuals that did not have the opportunity to receive a formal education.
100
  
 
2.5 Religious Leaders  
 Leaders of both the Muslim and Christian communities have participated in the 
peacebuilding efforts at all levels. The religious leaders have used their influence to protect 
vulnerable populations and have prevented attacks. Religious leaders have an extremely crucial 
role to play in promoting peace. They have facilitated ecumenical prayers and joint Christian and 
Muslim celebrations in order to encourage coexistence and religious tolerance.
101
  
 The heads of the three principal religious communities in CAR, Imam Oumar Kobin 
Layama, the Catholic Archbishop Dieudonné Nzapalainga and Reverend Nicolas Guerekoyame-
Gbangou of the Evangelical Alliance, created an inter-religious platform soon after the crisis 
broke out. They collaborated in their calls for a ceasefire and peace. They have played major 
roles domestically and internationally when organizing reconciliation agendas for international 
actors, such as the UN, EU, United States, and France. Their teamwork has become a symbol of 
religious coexistence.
102
  
 After the violence that was seen in September 2015, Layama, Nzapalainga, and 
Guerekoyame-Gbangou suffered a decrease in power and influence but proceeded with their 
commitments to end the violence. They have been threatened and physically targeted by those 
who oppose their promotion of peace. The visit by Pope Francis in November 2015 strengthened 
the influence of the religious leaders by having the leader of the Catholic Church assist them in 
their message. The Pope advocated for peace between the Christians and Muslims.
103
   
 In some remote villages, some priests have taken the role of ad hoc mediators to protect 
Muslim civilians that are at risk. These mediation efforts derived from the fact that Muslims 
                                                 
100
 “Analysis of conflict and peacebuilding in the Central African Republic." 
101
 "Religious Leaders Dialogue on the Central African Republic." M2 Presswire, January 08, 2014. 
102
 “Analysis of conflict and peacebuilding in the Central African Republic." 
103
 Rocca, Francis. "Pope Calls for End to Religious Violence at Central African Republic Mosque; Visits Area in 
Bangui Sheltering Muslims Fleeing Violence by Christian Militias." Wall Street Journal (New York), November 30, 
2015. 
s1893874 
30 
victimized by the anti-Balaka often were able to seek refuge in churches. Priests were in the 
position of being involved and became natural mediators in the districts where the anti-Balaka 
and their supporters surrounded Muslims. At the height of the violence committed against 
Muslims in early 2014, some priests provided protection to Muslims by hiding them from anti-
Balaka rage in their churches. Christian and Muslim leaders have participated and organized 
peace conferences and committees.
104
 
 
Chapter 3: Humanitarianism  
3.1 Theory 
 The modern humanitarianism theory developed after the end of the Cold War and was 
implemented in the new international order system. According to Michael Barnett, the broad 
definition of humanitarianism is the “desire to relieve the suffering of distant strangers.”105 
Humanitarianism emerged in a widespread manner when organizations structured the “idea of 
providing to those in immediate danger, reducing the suffering of the masses, and eliminating 
causes of harm.”106 These actions must be done impartially and independently. The 
establishment of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the development of 
international humanitarian law encouraged the institutionalization of humanitarianism in 
international and domestic organizations.  
 In the post-Cold War world system, humanitarianism has become politicized. 
Humanitarian organizations realize that humanitarian is the offspring of politics, that their 
policies and operations have political consequences, and they are inevitable components of the 
political world. However, humanitarian agencies have held the belief that humanitarian action 
and politics are separate, they can act independently from politics, and that they have been 
striving for this separation.
107
  
 The basic principle of humanitarian action, alleviating suffering, is based on humanity, 
not on politics. But since its politicization, humanitarian agencies have integrated human rights, 
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promotion of democracy, and state-building in their platforms. Therefore, the humanitarian 
sector, which was originally based on independence from politics, is now a part of the political 
system. Although some academics consider that this politicization of humanitarianism has 
shifted the field into a “golden age” because there is more funding, more support, and more 
organization in regards to saving suffering populations, this a minority position.
108
 Instead, most 
are concerned that the politicization has stained humanitarianism because of ethical concerns.  
 For the purpose of this thesis, it is important to discuss the connection of humanitarianism 
to peacebuilding processes. “Efforts to reconcile humanitarian action and peacebuilding on the 
ground especially during complex humanitarian emergencies are fought and tensions and 
challenges.”109 These challenges include definitional and operational issues, particularly the 
various competing structures and agendas.  
 A major challenge derives from the lack of transparency in the humanitarian community 
and what peacebuilding is and what its method of delivery is. Humanitarians determine 
peacebuilding to be a political process. This perspective means it is difficult for humanitarians to 
participate in peacebuilding efforts because of their principles require them to be neutral. 
Although, the current peacebuilding processes in various conflict areas incorporate humanitarian 
agencies when facilitating their operations. They are also politicized because many organizations 
are funded by state governments, therefore they are required to adhere to their donor’s 
stipulations, which may be political.  
 Peacebuilding is an all-encompassing and integrated strategy that is composed of various 
features, from politics, development to humanitarian and human rights programs and 
mechanisms. Peacebuilding a long and resource consuming process that occurs at multiple 
levels: the local, mid-level, and political level. Moreover, “the objective of peacebuilding is 
comprehensive and goes beyond ensuring the cessation of not only physical violence, but also 
structural violence caused by deep rooted cultural and institutional frameworks.”110 
Peacebuilding strives to end armed conflict while simultaneously attempting to resolve the 
conflict’s root causes with creating peace.  
                                                 
108
 Slim, Hugo. "Aid in Danger: The Perils and Promise of Humanitarianism." International Affairs 91, no. 3 
(2015): 629-31. 
109
 “Exploring the nexus between peacebuilding and humanitarianism: Opportunities & Challenges.” Horn of Africa 
Regional Program (HARP), Life & Peace Institute.  
110
 Ibid.  
s1893874 
32 
 When investigating the concurrence of humanitarianism and peacebuilding, there is a 
principle that both ideas share: preserving humanity. Furthermore, peacebuilding and 
humanitarian action both strive to create societal resilience in order develop local and national 
actors so that they have the ability to confront the current crisis and thwart off future conflicts. In 
this manner, the connection between the two principles is strengthened where humanitarians 
respond to the population’s needs, while peacebuilders strive to prevent more violence, which 
consequently can further exacerbate the humanitarian crisis. The root of peacebuilding and 
humanitarianism’s mandates are essentially the same because both want to protect and end 
suffering.  
 
3.2 Applying Humanitarianism to CAR 
 By applying the theoretical framework of humanitarianism, one can conceptualize the 
Central African crisis. Since CAR has experienced political and societal turbulence and 
instability, many international actors have utilized the politicized humanitarianism theory in 
order to facilitate CAR’s statehood. The major political crisis and the forceful transitions of 
governments have resulted in a conflict that saw the presence of humanitarian organizations 
alongside state and peacebuilding agencies.  
 The humanitarian lens calls for an assistance to ending the population’s suffering. 
Humanitarian actors were needed to respond to the brutal scenes of violence conducted by the 
armed groups. Also, peacebuilding actors responded to the conflict by sending in armed troops. 
France, being the first reactor to the conflict, felt obligated to because of their colonial past in the 
country. The French felt a sense of accountability for the violence and politicized the situation by 
sending French troops to protect civilians.  
 Peacebuilders can have humanitarian aspects in their agendas. It is obvious that armed 
peacebuilders attempt to protect and defend vulnerable populations. The MINUSCA mission 
alongside other international organizations incorporate features of both humanitarianism and 
peacebuilding principles. MINUSCA’s responsibilities include reforming the security sector, 
promote rule of law, support the local police, and creating community oriented policing, amongst 
others. These entail protecting the safety of civilians and also state-building.  
 Another important factor of humanitarianism is the ethical requirement to respond to 
crises. The healthcare humanitarian actors present in CAR, such as Doctors Without Borders 
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(MSF) and the ICRC, react to grave medical issues and strive to save lives. Other humanitarian 
agencies, mainly Christian organizations, focus on solving the situation through mediation, 
community building, and reconciliation initiatives.  
 CAR’s context is also quite interesting in terms of publicity. Numerous times the conflict 
has been described as neglected, even by international officials. However, there are still high 
numbers of humanitarian agencies present and many INGOs visit and research the conflict, such 
as Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International. But CAR’s conflict is not seen on the front 
page of newspapers nor discussed on social media. The extreme violence, the humanitarian 
crises, and the ethnic cleansing have not been focused on by the Global North. Nevertheless, 
there is still some funding being poured into CAR, but not as much as it desperately needs. This 
will be mentioned in the following section. 
 
Chapter 4: Endless Violence? 
June 2017 Ceasefire Agreement 
 A recent development in CAR’s peacemaking process occurred on June 19, 2017. The 
government and 14 rebel group representatives signed an immediate ceasefire in Rome, Italy 
after five days of negotiations. The ceasefire was facilitated by Community of Sant’Egidio, an 
Italian based Christian community that is recognized by the Roman Catholic Church. A point of 
contention here is that the conflict has seen bloodshed spilled over religion. Having a Christian 
organization hold a peace conference can be considered ill-advised because it ostracizes the 
Muslims. Also, holding another peace talk outside CAR, in an European city, separates the 
suffering civilians.  
 The Italian government and Sant-Edigio acted as mediators and emphasized the need for 
an AU presence when implementing the agreement, demonstrating the lack of knowledge on the 
population’s attitudes toward AU troops.  The current Special Representative of the United 
Nations Secretary-General in CAR, Parfait Onanga-Anyanga, called for the ceasefire meeting in 
response to the re-emergence of violence in certain areas. “We know that much remains to be 
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done. It is vital that the ceasefire agreed upon by the parties comes into force immediately to free 
the populations and the many regions of the country that are still suffering from armed.”111 
 After the general elections, there was relative peace in and around the regions by Bangui. 
However, the more distant regions had violent upheavals that saw 300 people dead and hundreds 
injured according to UN’s Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). UN 
Peacekeepers stationed in the southeast region also have been attacked and killed. Ornanga stated 
that this ceasefire agreement “makes it possible to envisage the future with additional optimism, 
confident that by virtue of the inter-Central African dialogue the daughters and sons of this 
beautiful country will be able to take their own destiny in their hands.”112  
 The ceasefire did not even last a day. There was an estimated 50 people killed in the 
northwestern region of Bria, located 580 kilometers from Bangui, despite the ceasefire 
agreement. Shotgun fighting broke out between rival armed factions on June 21st at dawn, 
according to the Bria mayor. Bodies were seen laying on the streets and dozens were treated at a 
local hospital run by MSF but multiple bodies have not been collected in some remote 
neighborhoods.  
 The agreement promised political representation to the armed groups in exchange for 
ending violent attacks and blockades. But as demonstrated by the violence, the ceasefire did not 
carry any significance. “We signed the agreement, but we have to defend ourselves, we can’t 
allow an attack to happen without reaction.”113 This was stated by Djamil Babanani, a 
spokesman for the Popular Front for the Rebirth of the Central African Republic (FPRC), an 
armed rebel group that was previously a part of the Séléka.  
 President Toudéra’s office praised the ceasefire as a historic accord. This praise was not 
shared by others in the capital. Joseph Bindoumi, president of the Central African League of 
Human Rights stated, “this accord simply follows the same scenario repeated over and over. 
Those who signed are mocking the people.”114 Bindoumi is not wrong, there have been multiple 
signed agreements to end the violence that have not come to fruition.  
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 The main issue is that these armed groups are continuously attacking civilians. Since 
March 2017, fighting has been on the increase in the eastern and the civilian populations are 
suffering. A major component is whether the armed group leaders that signed the ceasefire can 
exert sufficient authority over their soldiers and successfully disarm. It is difficult to determine, 
but the revenge and hatred that has been motivating these armed groups will need a strong 
alternative to violence.  
 
4.2 Current Figures 
 This section will briefly provide the most updated key figures on CAR’s humanitarian 
crisis in order to gage the severity of the conflict’s human cost. OCHA has provided estimated 
numbers as of June 2017, whereas other official reports by humanitarian organizations are not as 
recent. There are 481,000 Central African refugees, 503,600 IDP’s, and 2.2 million in need of 
assistance and protection. The Humanitarian Response Plan’s funding status has a total estimated 
requirement of $399.5 million USD but the funding to date is at $120.8 million. That is a funding 
gap of $278.7 million and only 30.2% of the plan’s budget.115 Without this funding, most 
civilians do not have access to proper medical care and food.  
 This section will discuss the recent violence. Within the past months of 2017, pockets of 
violence caused by former members of both the Séléka and anti-Balaka has caused civil unrest in 
various provinces. According to UN and media reports, fighting in the southeast provinces of 
Mbomou, Basse-Kotto, and Haute-Kotto internally displaced an approximate 100,000 citizens in 
May and prompted an estimated 20,600 people to flee to the DRC. In Alindao, violence resulted 
in at least 130 people dead and caused 11,000 to seek refuge internally. The June 2017 IDP 
number increased 14 percent from April estimates. The rising numbers are due to the targeting of 
civilians by armed groups. Due to this, humanitarian organizations and NGOs are struggling to 
gain access to certain areas. There have been reports of attacks on aid workers, which an 
impediment to aid operations.  Humanitarian organizations also lack funding and international 
attention as another reason they do not have the resources and materials to spread out their 
operations to afflicted provinces.
116
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 Although the UN agencies are most likely to be the most well-funded and represented 
actor in CAR currently, it is necessary to be critical of these ‘official’ reports. There is a 
possibility of a margin of error due to CAR’s lack of infrastructure and inability to reach remote 
areas. In reality, these numbers may be much higher. To continue, I realize that utilizing reports 
conducted by NGOs or other actors need to be assessed critically because the probability of 
accurately representing the various issues in an independent manner is small. They also are 
subject to margins of error and most likely do not depict the full situation.  
 
Chapter 5: Conclusion  
5.1 Justice 
 CAR’s peacebuilding process established a tribunal, the Special Criminal Court (SCC) in 
collaboration with the International Criminal Court (ICC) that is seated in The Hague, in June 
2015. CAR has a history of impunity that needs to be addressed in order to serve justice to the 
victims of the conflict, whose human rights have been grossly violated and those who have 
experienced atrocious crimes. The new SCC tribunal is composed of domestic and international 
staff and its major feature is accountability promotion to curtail violence. The tribunal has a truth 
and reconciliation committee. “Truth-telling can play an important role after a conflict, but it 
does not replace the need for prosecutions of serious crimes in fair and credible trials. Victims 
should not be deprived of their assailant being brought to court, nor should perpetrators be able 
to escape the law.”117  
 It is important to note that having the court embedded in CAR’s national justice system, 
staffed by locals, is a significant step towards peace because it does not separate the suffering 
population from the justice process.
118
 Nonetheless, the ICC is conducting their own 
investigations into crimes against humanity, war crimes, amongst other charges. I argue that 
prosecution and the trials should be operated locally in order for the average citizen to see the 
justice process take place, rather in a distant, European country that has not experienced the 
gravity of CAR’s violence. It is necessary to have technical and other material support from the 
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ICC and other international actors in order to conduct the investigations and prosecutions in a 
secure manner.  
 Reflecting back on Paffenholz’s definition of peace requiring a vibrant civil society, 
justice will mobilize political participation and representation. Central Africans need to see those 
accountable prosecuted in order to facilitate reconciliation. Also, there is an important gender 
sensitive issue that needs to be addressed by the courts. Members of the armed groups and the 
MINUSCA mission have been accused of rape and sexually abuse from the vulnerable civilians 
in enclaves that need to be brought to justice.
119
 Nonetheless, this might be difficult to identify 
the exact perpetrators and victims may be too traumatized to go through the prosecution process. 
Also, French forces were dismissed of charges accusing them of sexually abusing children by a 
French judge in January 2017.
120
 This is extremely frustrating and grossly horrendous because 
their purpose was to protect and prevent harm for those defenseless populations and their 
domestic court system did not even allow the cases to go to trial. I suggest that the SCC and ICC 
expand their jurisdiction to investigate UN Peacekeepers and this will bring a sense of 
legitimacy, justice, and end their impunity. This might be difficult because Peacekeepers report 
to their nation’s judicial system. Another suggestion could be to open a special tribunal for the 
sole purpose of prosecuting alleged crimes committed by peacekeepers.  
 
5.2 Education  
 I argue that CAR’s society socialized the population into two categories: Christians and 
Muslims. Deeply embedded resentment and political competition between the two groups have a 
history based on economic inequality and power struggles. The prior peace initiatives have 
addressed the religious and political element but have lacked one crucial element: education. 
Education is immensely critical to the creating sustainable peace. The Central African youth 
have not been able to attend school due to violence, but in the recent months some schools have 
re-opened. The new government should invest in education and establishing a socialization 
platform that builds trust and equality between the groups is a suggestion on how to eradicate the 
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hostility. “By establishing non-traditional learning spaces to educate for peace, peace can 
become more of a process and less of a product for children.”121 Teachers can be trained in this 
framework provided by internal and external experts on conflict resolution.  
 The education system that was created after the 1994 Rwandan genocide can serve as an 
example for CAR. Both Rwanda and CAR share similar colonial histories and their populations 
experienced systematic divisions. In post-genocide Rwanda, the state-sponsored education 
system promoted equality and a culture of peace and national unity. Their policies strived to 
“guarantee inclusive and equal educational opportunities to all Rwandans.”122 This was done in 
various ways but the primary one was having the classrooms and the youth be of both ethnicities, 
eliminating the divide.  
 Although it will be extremely difficult to re-socialize populations and adjust how the 
communities view each other, education is a step that can be taken to achieve this. Schools can 
have both communities present in the classrooms in order to create civility and trust. The youth 
are the ones who have been neglected in CAR; their lack of opportunities due to conflict creates 
frustration against the feared ‘other’ and encourages joining armed groups. By providing 
education, this frustration can be diminished. However, I realize that disarment beforehand is 
required because it not, the children will be unsafe.   
 
5.3 Final Argument  
 CAR’s peacebuilding process has been composed of peace treaties, NGOs, religious 
actors,  democratic elections, etc. The prior peace agreements signed by elites and armed group 
leaders have occurred mostly outside of CAR. This is important because peace has been 
negotiated outside of the conflict and consequently caused their failure. Decisions and 
conferences, the notable exception being the Bangui Forum, are held in other, mostly African 
states and seated by elites who are not suffering. The national ownership does not reflect the 
civilians, there is not enough national dialogue. Funding, amongst other decisions regarding 
peacekeeping, is decided in Brussels and New York without significant representation from 
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CAR. This conduct of the peacebuilding process is limiting and frustrating. I argue that the prior 
peace initiatives have not hindered the brutality because most of the initiatives do not directly 
impact or represent the civilians.  
 By having the SCC and the promotion of accountability is a major step but the lack of a 
cohesive Central African identity is also a key deterrent. This separation can be addressed 
through education and socialization projects. These initiatives need to foster a sense of a holistic 
and inclusive Central African identity, where citizens do not fear the other and have equal 
opportunities. 
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